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The full costs of armed conflict are enormous and total world military expenditure is 
huge. Psychological theories and concepts to explain support for war and militarism 
at individual and group levels include: warfare as a masculine institution; social 
identity theory; nationalist versus internationalist attitudes; and the contact 
hypothesis. At a collective level militarism is legitimised. War and deadly weapons are 
portrayed in positive and unrealistic ways. Support for militarism permeates civic 
society and citizens are ‘cognitively disarmed’ about it and the role they play in 
supporting it. Psychologists have promoting militarism by working for the military and 
the changing nature of war and armaments, such as the use of drones, is providing 
further temptations to do so. Psychology has at best been ambivalent about militarism. 
Peace psychology has not taken an unambiguous position on it, often speaking of the 
absence of war in the absence of social justice as ‘negative peace’. The British 
Psychological Society is failing to recognise and oppose militarism. Community 
psychology should take a lead in arguing for a more clearly identified Psychology 
Against Militarism (PAM). 
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1. The costs of war and militarisation 
 
The full costs of armed conflict are enormous and not always easy to estimate. They include 
not only deaths and injuries to combatants, and increasingly to civilians, but also the full range of 
forms of psychological distress, not limited to post-traumatic stress disorder (Fazel, 2015), plus 
multiple other impacts on health and well-being. Recently the cholera epidemic in Yemen 
became the largest and fastest-spreading outbreak of the disease in modern history, with a 
million cases expected and at least half a million children likely to be affected (Guardian Weekly 
20 October, 2017). Health impacts include the reduced availability of vaccination for children in 
conflict conditions and the failure of support for those with disabilities and long-term health 
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conditions (Kett, 2015). Damage and destruction of people’s homes and the displacement of 
civilian populations is a frequent effect of war: Seguin et al. (2016) used Hobfoll’s (1998) 
conservation of resources theory to understand loss of resources experienced by women 
internally displaced in Georgia. There is also environmental destruction, either deliberate, for 
example due to defoliation and the release of chemical toxins (Weir, 2015), or associated with 
military facilities due to nuclear tests, chemicals, fuels, radioactivity and high explosives. 
The special issue of child soldiers continues to be important in various parts of the world. It 
was reported (Guardian Weekly 27 October, 2017) that the youth minister in Yemen’s Huthi 
rebel government had proposed suspending school classes for a year and sending pupils and 
teachers to the front. A recent Medact (2016) report has drawn attention to under-age recruitment 
to the armed forces in the UK: 22 of every 100 UK army recruits are under 18 and, although they 
are not deployed on frontline activity at that age, they are more vulnerable to being casualties 
later – for example being twice as likely to have been killed or injured in Afghanistan than those 
recruited at an older age.  
According to the Global Peace Index produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, in 
2014 the estimated total cost of violent conflict, including providing services for refugees and 
internally displaced people, was $14.3 trillion, equivalent to 13.4% of total gross domestic 
product (Guardian Weekly, June 26, 2015). These costs and the more direct costs of war 
generally bear more heavily on the poor and disproportionately on women and children (Shaw, 
2005). The database kept by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
showed total world military expenditure rising to $1.69tn in 2016 with spending continuing to 
grow in Asia and Oceania, Central and Eastern Europe and North Africa (CAAT, 2017). Russia 
has just announced testing of a new line of strategic, nuclear-capable weapons and Britain’s 
defence chief of general staff has called for increased military spending, warning that the UK is 
falling behind Russia in terms of defence spending and capability (Guardian Weekly 26 January 
& 9 March, 2018).  
In The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade, Feinstein (2012) describes the bribery 
and corruption that characterise the arms trade, involving even the most officially respected arms 
companies, the shadowy relationships with governments, and the ‘revolving door’ through which 
people move between government, the military and the arms industry. Formal weapons 
cooperation agreements (WCAs) which regulate areas such as procurement and contracting, 
defense-based research and development, and defense industrial cooperation, have proliferated 
since the mid-1990s and according to Kinne’s (2016) analysis have significantly increased 
weapons flows. 
The nature of armed conflict has been changing and, some argue, is becoming more 
dangerous and costly. In The New Western Way of War, Shaw (2005) referred to the industrialised 
total warfare of the second world war, which including deliberate targeting of civilian 
populations, as ‘degenerate war’. Although more recently weapons are described as ‘precise’, 
civilian targets as systematically ‘avoided’, and deaths as ‘accidental’ (p. 67), he points out that 
bombing is not precise and in practice minimising civilian risks is not given such high priority as 
minimising those of Western personnel. As Bourke (2014) puts it, ‘the illusion of precision 
allows American and British authorities to portray ‘collateral damage’ as the result of inadvertent 
mistakes rather than as inherent aspects of the targeting process’ (Bourke, 2014, p. 125). 
Even more recently, targeted bombing is being delivered by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs 
or ‘drones’), raising many issues, discussed for example by Chamayou (2015). Drones, he 
suggests, have created a crisis in military ethics. Willingness to die is at the heart of traditional 
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military morality with its central virtues of courage, sacrifice and heroism. Killing by drones 
without risking one’s own life might be seen in those terms as cowardly and dishonourable: 
‘moral injury’ has been described as a new military syndrome. Bandura (2017) is one who has 
argued that drone operators face a further ‘discordant moral predicament’, since not acting to 
defend their soldiers on the ground violates the army ethos of supporting comrades while 
protective action violates the just war rule about civilian casualties.  
Psychologist Steven Pinker (2012) is prominent amongst those who argue that war is on the 
decline. He acknowledges that in absolute numbers twentieth century wars were unmatched in 
their destructiveness, but in terms of death toll as a proportion of the population, earlier wars 
were more deadly and attitudes towards violence were far more accepting. What he refers to as 
an unwarranted ‘new pessimism’ about war, he believes has been stoked by three kinds of 
organised violence: the ‘new wars’ or ‘low-intensity conflicts’ in the developing world, thought 
to be especially destructive because of the hunger and disease they cause; genocide; and 
terrorism. However, only recently have political scientists tried to measure these and all, he says, 
are in decline. Inglehart, Puranen, and Welzel (2015) are others who have concluded, on the 
basis of analysing public opinion data from many countries over three decades, that rising life 
opportunities have made peace generally more desirable and have reduced people’s willingness 
to sacrifice lives in war. 
Although they do not take such a sanguine view, international law experts Hathaway & 
Shapiro (2017) do describe the end of the ‘old world order’ that occurred with the signing in 
1928 of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, later known as the Paris Peace Pact, and 
the settlement after the second world war: in the ‘new world order’ inter-state war, other than in 
self-defence, is prohibited by international law. 
 
 
2. Understanding Individual Support for War and Militarism 
 
A range of different theories and concepts have been proposed to try and explain support for 
war and militarism at an individual level (Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors & Preston, 2010). They 
include a shared human instinct for war (now largely dismissed as useful), authoritarian 
personality, religious fundamentalism (Beller, 2017), and the need to control, dominate or exert 
authority (Finley, 2003). As feminists and others have often pointed out, warfare is a masculine 
institution with the military characterised by masculine values and metaphors, and fighting, as 
well as strategy, coordination and support, dominated by men (Caspary, 1993; Holmes, 
1985/2003). Arms designers, producers and dealers and the staff of military establishments and 
state defence departments are overwhelmingly male, operating in ‘highly masculinist institutions 
that glorify and promote the traditional male values of strength, power, and competitive 
advantage’ (Du Nann Winter, Pilisuk, Houck & Lee, 2001, p. 144). It is a common finding that 
women hold more negative attitudes towards war than men (Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2017; 
Van der Linden, Bizumic, Stubager & Mellon, 2011).  
But there are individual differences in militaristic attitudes. Studies of public attitudes towards 
state foreign policy in the USA have generally supported a two-dimensional attitude structure. 
That was confirmed in a study using five British national surveys conducted in 2008 which 
found two dimensions labelled liberal internationalism and British militarism (Reifler, Scotto & 
Clarke, 2011). Those relatively high on the second dimension tended to agree with statements 
 110 
such as: Britain needs to spend more money on its armed forces, and Britain should maintain its 
overseas military bases. Van der Linden et al. (2011) considered social representations of war, 
citing for example Herrera and Reicher (1998) who found differing social representations of war 
following the first Gulf War: anti-war respondents more often recalled images of destruction and 
suffering whereas pro-war participants more often recalled images about the technical aspects of 
war such as images of soldiers, the firing of cruise missiles and the dropping of bombs. Bliss, 
Oh, and Williams (2007) found nationalism (belief that one’s nation is superior) and patriotism 
(love and pride for nation) positively related, and internationalism (concern for other nations and 
global welfare) negatively related, to militarism. Although attitudes in favour of peace and war 
are often conceptualised as polar opposites, the two sets of values may be distinct constructs 
(Bizumic et al., 2013). 
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) continues to have great relevance for 
understanding hostile attitudes of those who self-identify as members of one group towards those 
who are, in contrast, seen as being members of other groups. Accentuating the in-group’s 
positive attributes and the negative attributes of out-group members is strengthened and rendered 
more dangerous if the perception of the ‘other’ is a stereotyped one and particularly if it 
corresponds to a threatening ‘enemy’ image (Cottam et al., 2010). Nationalism can be seen as a 
particular case of social identity. Citizens’ nationalistic sentiments can be manipulated by leaders 
using the promotion of positive images of one’s own culture: ‘National flags, heroes, myths, and 
anthems all have a remarkable hold over most people, and almost all nations seek to inculcate 
recognition and respect for such symbols, typically requiring oaths, pledges, or other specific 
acts of allegiance’ (Druckman, 2001, p. 128). Nationalism can also confer heightened sensitivity 
to threats or insults, and openness to manipulation by leaders’ suggestions about the need for 
national sacrifices such as greater spending on defence and the value of serving in the military. A 
related feature is inability to look critically at one’s own group or country and refusal to look at 
one’s own country’s role in contributing to inter-group tensions (Cottam et al., 2010). Violence is 
further legitimated by a process of dehumanising the enemy (Barash & Webel, 2009), or what 
post-Freudians might refer to as ‘splitting and projecting demonised images onto the enemy’ 
(Caspary, 1993). Group loyalty, obedience and conformity are prized at times of inter-group 
tension; citizens experience great pressure to conform when nationalism is aroused and can face 
ostracism and condemnation by others if one does not conform, as for example in Britain during 
the first world war and in the USA after 9/11 (Cottam et al., 2010). 
Another highly relevant theory is the contact hypothesis – that intergroup contact reduces 
prejudice and that positive contact can increase trust and improve attitudes between groups in 
conflict. McKeown and Psaltis (2017) refer to it as one of the most successful theories in social 
psychology. A recent special edition of Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 
(Wright, Tropp & Mazziotta, 2017) includes a collection of such contact research from a wide 
range of contexts. They included a study among Bosnian adults of how pre-war cross-group 
contact and experience of war affected post-war cross-group contact and its relation to measures 
of intergroup relations and mental health (Voci, Hadziosmanovic, Cakal, Veneziani & Hewstone, 
2017); and an analysis of representative national surveys in the UK one month before and after 
the July 7, 2005, terror attacks in London, which showed that while the terror attacks generally 
heightened feelings of psychological threat, contact still predicted lower prejudice toward 
Muslims through lowering perceptions of psychological threat (Abrams, Van de Vyver & 
Vasiljevic, 2017). 
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3. Understanding Collective Support for War and Militarism: The 
Militarisation of Culture and Civic Society 
 
Militarism is deeply socially rooted and perhaps increasingly so. Chamayou (2015) talks of 
the rapid expansion in the use of drones being accompanied by a ‘theoretical offensive’ 
justifying them, including the declaration that drones are humanitarian weapons because of their 
supposed superior precision. A further part of the discursive strategy used to support drone 
warfare is the use of historical examples to argue that there is nothing new about preferring to 
take out one’s enemies from a safe distance wherever possible. More generally, Solomon (2003) 
has argued that, despite the popular ‘democratic peace’ thesis suggesting that democracies do not 
fight each other, citizens of democratic states are just as complicit as others in the continual 
replenishment of state militarisation. His thesis is that citizens of democracies become integral 
participants in supporting the competitive arming of states, whilst themselves being ‘cognitively 
disarmed’ because they are provided by their leaders with only a limited and highly prejudiced 
understanding of the moral implications of their supportive roles. 
Referring specifically to the US, several scholars have attributed the perpetuation of the 
country as a military-industrial complex to the conservative political culture of US society, whilst 
others attribute it to the military superiority of the USA and militarised worldview (Van den 
Linden et al., 2011, p. 223). Others have noted the prominence of wars in people’s 
representations of history in different countries; for example, the much greater weight given to 
war compared to peace in US history textbooks (Finley, 2003). In his book, Acts of War: The 
Behaviour of Men in Battle, Holmes (1985/2003) refers to the popularity of military history and 
of books and films dealing with war, and their polemical purposes, justifying armed conflict with 
scant regard for the facts of war. And in her more recent book, historian Joanna Bourke (2014) 
documents how the armed forces have used cinema very effectively, as for example in films 
about the Vietnam war, which spread a strong anti-communist message and helped US citizens 
see the war as one of liberation and freedom. 
There are numerous ways in which militarism permeates civic society. For example, Feinstein 
(2012) refers to the militarisation of the University and the school: in Britain the first secondary 
school ‘military academy’ has recently opened and there are reports of the international arms 
company BAE Systems offering postgraduate apprenticeships and a Masters programme and 
collaboration on drone development at British Universities (CAAT, 2018). As Bourke (2014) 
puts it, deadly weapons are routinely aestheticised as objects of beauty, even charm. We need, 
she suggests, ‘to come to terms with the over-blown, breathless, vivid and carnivalesque 
language associated with violence’ (p. 17). Positive and sporting images are used to describe 
armaments, and weapons are given comforting names including ones from nature such as the 
Falcon, Hummingbird Warrior, Panda and Walrus. Even the cluster bombs that caused appalling 
wounds in Vietnam were given nicknames such as ‘pineapples’ and ‘guavas’. In September 2017 
it was reported that a statue of Mikhail Kalashnikov, the inventor of the AK-47 assault rifle, had 
been unveiled in central Moscow. The nine-metre monument depicts Kalashnikov clutching his 
automatic weapon. The event was attended by high-ranking officials and religious leaders. The 
collusion of formal religion in militarism is illustrated by the blessing of the statue by a Russian 
Orthodox priest who shrugged off suggestions that it was inappropriate to sprinkle holy water on 
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a statue of a weapons designer. Another religious leader wrote on Facebook, ‘Our weapon is a 
holy weapon’ (Guardian Weekly 20 September, 2017). 
War games now illustrate the deep rootedness of militarisation in the starkest possible way. 
War toys, mass produced since the second half of the 18th century, amongst which tin soldiers 
used to be the most popular, were, according to Mosse (1990, p. 141) ‘an education in warfare’ 
and important in the process of trivialising war. Bourke (2014) brings this part of the 
militarisation of culture – the ‘military-industrial-entertainment-complex’ (Der Derian, 2001, 
cited by Bourke, 2014) – up to date with some alarming facts. By the 1980s 10% of toys for sale 
in the US were war toys. By 1997 over 30 million toy guns were being sold annually in the USA. 
According to Bourke, ‘gamers are required to digest vast amount of technical knowledge about 
weapons and ballistics’ (p. 196) and recent games include short documentaries about real-life 
happenings, interviews with veterans and online visits to battle sites. There are now military 
training applications for commercial game consoles. War games also, Bourke suggests, teach real 
soldiers how to make war more game-like, attempting to make their combat experiences 
resemble those in the games and vice versa. For example, one 20-year-old serving in Iraq 
recalled the first time he shot someone: ‘You just try to block it out... see what you need to do, 
fire what you need to fire. Think to yourself, this is a game, just do it, just do it...’ (interviewed 
for the Washington Post, 14 February, 2006, cited by Bourke, 2014, p. 215). He and his mates 
would often play war games until the early hours of the morning and then go on patrol. 
Optimists such as Pinker dismiss such comments as overly pessimistic punditry. He believes 
there has been a ‘decline of martial culture’ (2012, p. 28), thanks to a long-term civilising 
process, starting in the middle ages and given a huge boost by the enlightenment. The First 
World War, he argues, put an end to romantic militarism in the Western mainstream and the 
whole idea that war was in any way desirable or inevitable, glorious or heroic; ‘in the West today 
public places are no longer named after military victories. Our war memorials depict not proud 
commanders on horseback but weeping mothers, weary soldiers, or exhaustive lists of names of 
the dead. Military men are inconspicuous in public life, with drab uniforms and little prestige’ 
(pp. 28-29). 
 
 
4. Psychologists Working for the Military: Professional Co-option 
 
In his book, War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology (1980), Watson, 
who obtained access to a large amount of classified information, exposed ‘the extent to which the 
military potential of psychology had been ruthlessly exploited’ (p. 22). The use of psychology 
covered a range of subjects including selection and training of personnel, improving the 
efficiency with which soldiers used armaments, the effectiveness of military leadership, 
improving military performance under stress, understanding the enemy, and torture and other 
interrogation techniques, including techniques used during internment in Northern Ireland. 
Bourke (2014) points out that academic researchers may not even be aware of the military 
applications of their findings. In 1971 students published a two-volume report listing over 100 
research contracts, held by academics at Stanford University, which were fully or partially 
funded by the US Department of Defense. While the academics described their research as aimed 
at such outcomes as improving traffic or reducing pollution, the Defense Documentation Center 
(DDC) gave very different accounts. The famous prison study contract carried out by 
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psychologist Zimbardo, for example, was described as being about ‘Individual and group 
variables influencing emotional arousal, violence, and behavior’, but the DDC title referred to, 
‘Personnel technology factors influencing disruptive behavior among military trainees’ (cited by 
Bourke, p. 148). 
The ethical conflict for psychologists working for the military in one way or another is well 
pointed up by Arrigo, Eidelson, and Bennett (2012) and Arrigo, Eidelson, and Rockwood (2015), 
writing about ‘operational psychology’ (OP) in the USA. They distinguished between 
‘collaborative operational psychology’ (COP) concerned with such things as the selection of 
service personnel, health assessments and trauma therapy, and ‘adversarial operational 
psychology’ (AOP) which ‘engages psychologists in direct support of deception, coercion, and 
assault in military and intelligence operations and in covert operations research’ (Arrigo et al., 
2012, p. 386). They argue that AOP is not subject to ethical oversight by anybody outside the 
national security establishment, and the targets of AOP interventions are unable to provide 
informed consent, may be harmed in stipulated ways and have little or no recourse to complaint 
or redress. Crucially, ‘the psychologist engaged in AOP activities is a fully deployable soldier, 
typically a member of a highly coordinated and interdependent team, obligated to put the 
operational mission first, under national security criteria that supersede the APA Ethics Code... 
The moral autonomy of the military psychologist is quite limited’ (Arrigo et al., 2015, p. 271) 
(incidentally, doctors and other health workers, lawyers and chaplains working for the military 
share some of the same ethical dilemmas: Nathanson, 2015; Bourke, 2014; Virden, 2003). Staal 
and Greene (2015), operational psychologists at US Special Operations Command, and each a 
current or retired Colonel in the United States Air Force, objected, arguing that OP was not alone 
in posing such dilemmas and requiring ultimate loyalty to the institutions for which 
psychologists work. 
The changing nature of war and armaments is providing further temptations for psychologists 
to contribute to militarisation. Chamayou (2015) provides several examples of how 
psychological knowledge and expertise has been drawn on to help justify drone warfare. One 
involves the use of social network analysis and cognitive science in the panoptican-like 
surveillance systems used to identify, study, follow, and in some cases ultimately target, 
suspected individuals. The March 2015 edition of The Psychologist reported the formation by the 
British Army of a new 2000-strong Brigade 77. Its members, we are told, will focus on 
information, media and psychological operations, including, according to an Army spokesperson, 
‘traditional and unconventional means of shaping behaviours’.  
Is British psychology becoming more overtly militarised? One of the themes of the 2015 
annual conference of the British Psychological Society was War and Psychology. That subject 
was addressed in keynote talks by three prominent speakers, psychiatrist, historian, and news 
correspondent respectively, plus three symposia. The main focus was psychological harm for 
combatants, and its treatment, plus psychology applied to recruitment and training. Only BBC 
correspondent Kate Adie – at least according to the summaries in The Psychologist – referred to 
‘the abnormality, the violence and unfairness of war’. Nowhere else could I find even a hint of 
British psychology taking as its starting point the idea that war and militarisation are themselves 
problems, things to be understood and avoided. Nor was there any sign of critical reflection on, 
‘the obedience of the discipline [psychology] to the mores of... militarism. Psychology’s 
contribution to the security state (Roberts et al., 2014). 
A proposal to the British Psychological Society was made in 2016 for a new Section of the 
Society on Psychology in Defence and Security. In response to a letter and an article in the 
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December 2016 Psychologist supporting that proposal, a letter I wrote was published in the 
February 2017 issue. Like Arrigo et al. (2012), I questioned the scope of Defence and Security 
psychology and whether it would extend to such topics as weapons research, understanding the 
enemy, and interrogation techniques. I suggested Military Psychology as a more straightforward 
name for any new Section; ‘Defence and Security’ might sound too much like Government 
propaganda. Another letter, critical of mine, appeared in a subsequent issue, from a veteran and 
psychologist working within the Ministry of Defence, arguing that it is mistaken to reduce the 
work of the military to war-fighting: ‘War is the last resort, and … it is the last thing that most of 
the military want to do’. The reference to Last Resort is highly significant because it is one of the 
necessary conditions for going to war in Just War Theory (Frowe, 2011) and one which it is 
always difficult to be clear about (Hoffman, 2015). 
 
 
5. Towards a Psychology Against Militarism 
 
Psychology has not spoken out unequivocally against militarism. Peace psychology, which is 
a well-established sub-discipline, largely concerned with conflict resolution, peace-making 
interventions, peace education and peace movements (Blumberg, Hare & Costin, 2006), has not 
taken an unambiguous position on militarism, often speaking of the absence of war in the 
absence of social justice as ‘negative peace’, implying that armed conflict may sometimes be 
justified. Mere peace in the face of political or economic oppression is downplayed as a 
relatively conservative goal, even a passive state. As Barash and Webel (2009, p. 91-92) say, ‘For 
too long, students of peace – in their legitimate eagerness to embrace a new and more peaceful 
world – have abandoned the understanding of war and other forms of violent human conflict 
to.... [the] disciplines of political science, security studies, and international relations. As a 
result... many people in peace and conflict studies and in peace movements spend much time 
trying to conceptualize peace while avoiding the very real problems of war and violence’. 
It might be expected that feminist psychology would be a locus of anti-militarism. Indeed 
feminists, whose perspective shares much with peace psychology, have often been very clear in 
their opposition to militarism (Costin, 2006), and women have taken a courageous lead in 
opposing militarism, as at the famous camps at Greenham Common in the UK and at Seneca 
Falls in the USA. However, at other times feminist groups have appeared to condone warfare, for 
example advocating for women to have greater acceptance in the armed forces, including 
acceptance in combat roles.  
Voices are increasingly being raised against militarism. Solomon (2003) calls for an 
organised, grassroots campaign that would, ‘call for the formation of a new, global political 
constituency dedicated to the twin aims of demilitarization and nonviolent conflict resolution’ (p. 
117). The demilitarising of schools and counter-recruitment movements in the USA, aiming both 
to protect children and to transform US military culture (Harding & Kershner, 2015), are 
examples. Particularly telling may be organised resistance amongst veterans such as Vietnam 
Veterans against the War and Iraq Veterans Against the War. Scientists and health workers are 
other groups with a long history of opposition to war: MedAct, currently active in the UK, is an 
example. 
I have argued elsewhere (Orford, 2017) that we need a more clearly identified Psychology 
Against Militarism (PAM). It should provide a full account of the psychological and other costs 
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of war, how those costs bear differentially upon different social and socio-economic groups, how 
militarism and violent solutions to conflict are justified and promoted, including the militarism of 
childhood, of educational establishments, of games, of masculinity, of history, and of economic 
life, enjoyment of and vested interests in war, and support for armaments and the arms trade. I 
also argue that it is appropriate for community psychology (CP) to take a lead in advocating for 
PAM. Militarism is a good example of how the beliefs and actions of individuals are embedded 
in and inseparable from the wider social context of collective beliefs and actions at community, 
national and international levels, and hence how it is legitimised, and how in the process we 
become complicit in supporting it. PAM is also consistent with CP ethics and values because 
militarism represents an exercise of power, which wreaks untold and widespread harm which 
falls on all of us, but especially on those who are already relatively powerless. Power is a central 
concept for CP (Orford, 2008) and militarism in its modern form might be said to constitute the 
largest concentration of power the world has ever seen. 
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